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the subject. Complex spatial models and 
intricate formulas may lead to confusion 
and a lack of understanding on the part 
of the audience which the editors wish to 
reach. Considering that Heckelman and 
Miller sought to compose an approach-
able Handbook which is distinct in this 
regard from other more expert books such 
as The Elgar Companion to Public Choice by 
Shugart and Razzolini, it is question able 
whether they reached their goal. It may 
even be concluded that this Handbook is 
partially redundant, given other previous-
ly written books covering this field of re-
search. Nevertheless, this Handbook seeks 
to assort a collection of all relevant social 
choice aspects and provides a good to very 
good insight of this field of science. Espe-
cially the detailed glossary and index are 
useful for a quick orientation. 
Another point of criticism is the fact that 
many of the models analysed only apply 
to presidential systems using majority 
rule, such as that of the United States. A 
parliamentary system with proportion-
al representation is often not included in 
the practical analysis and does not receive 
enough consideration. On the contrary, 
empirical findings refer most often to the 
US Congress (e.g. Chapter 18 “Measuring 
ideology in Congress”). The process of co-
alition formation and social choice theo-
ry on proportional voting systems is not 
covered at all, leaving several questions un-
answered. How are coalitions formed and 
how does this affect the voting behaviour 
of citizens? 
A greater use of “real life” examples – found 
in chapter five – would have increased the 
clarity of the Handbook especially for a 
non-specialist audience. Moreover, con-
sidering that the field of social choice is 
constantly evolving, it might have been 
desirable to include a look at the future 
prospects of the field. 
Nonetheless, the Handbook by Heckel-
man and Miller provides a comprehen-
sive and up-to-date overview of the vast 
and seemingly impenetrable field of social 
choice and voting. Written in a reasonably 
understandable technical style, the authors 
succeed in making complex issues rela-
tively accessible to a non-expert audience. 
Therefore, the Handbook of Social Choice 
and Voting is a great addition to every 
bookshelf and recommended to all schol-
ars who are interested in this field of study.
Heckelman, Jac C. / Miller, Nicholas R. 
(eds.) (2015): Handbook of Social Choice 
and Voting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
424 pages. ISBN: 978-1-783-47072-3. 
Price: £140.
he future of subsequent gener-
ations is the subject of growing 
social concern as well as becom-
ing a pressing question for economists and 
philosophers in the context of large-scale 
political, social and environmental up-
heaval (economic crises, pension schemes, 
environmental disasters...).
The purpose of Intergenerational Justice 
is to address this issue by providing a 
framework for philosophical reflection 
through sixteen articles by internationally 
recognised philosophers. It questions the 
content and the relevance of a theory for 
future generations. Do present generations 
have responsibilities or even obligations 
towards future individuals? Is it possible 
for generations to cooperate, even though 
they will never meet? 
The book is intended primarily for readers 
well versed in the subject, witness its some-
times technical language and demonstra-
tions. Clearly structured, it is divided into 
a theoretical part (“theory”) and an analy-
sis of specific cases (“specific cases”). How-
ever, the present review will not follow this 
configuration, for both epistemological 
(theory never goes without practice, syn-
thesis without analysis) and organizational 
considerations (the articles’ content do not 
legitimise such a distinction). A thematic 
analysis will be privileged in order to syn-
thesise the various contributions.
Intergenerational Justice exposes the theories 
commonly used to analyse the problem of 
future generations: Communitarianism 
(J. Thompson), Libertarianism (H. Stein-
er, P. Vallentyne), Contractualism (S.M. 
Gardiner, D. Heyd, D. Attas, R. Kumar), 
Marxism (C. Bertram), Reciprocity (A. 
Gosseries), Sufficientarianism (L.H. Mey-
er, D. Roser, C. Wolf ), Egalitarianism (G. 
Arrhenius) and Constitutionalism (V. M. 
Muniz-Fraticelli).
Obligations regarding future generations 
create a clear partition between the differ-
ent theories. Do present generations have 
a duty towards non-contemporaries? For 
Thompson, the notion of obligation is 
both necessary and desirable: the “life-
time-transcending interests” concept (the 
existence of interests that remain after 
the death of the individual) allows the 
existence of a chain of intergenerational 
bonds. Our future demands will depend 
on future individuals. This expectation 
towards future generations justifies a duty 
of respect for all non-existent individuals 
– be it of the dead or of future individ-
uals – and the development of a “trans-
generational policy”. Unfortunately, the 
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 practical  implementation of this policy is 
not spelled out by Thompson. The author 
defines herself as partisan of a “weak com-
munitarianism”, a patchwork of liberal and 
communitarian ideas promoting the rights 
of individuals and the existence of a com-
mon good. According to Thompson, the 
liberal approach is not relevant because it 
focuses on the interests of contemporaries, 
and leaves out the question of intergener-
ational bonds, relegating it as a marginal 
issue. On the other hand, “strong com-
munitarianism” (the self as a communal 
structure) is contradicted by the empirical 
reality of growing multiculturalism, which 
makes it difficult to think of a common 
and interchangeable citizen identity. 
The degrees of obligations for libertarian-
ism, defined as invoking a strong respect 
for private property, vary depending on 
whether it is a right-wing libertarianism 
(agents can acquire full property of things 
not owned, like nature) or a left-wing lib-
ertarianism (natural resources collectively 
belong to everyone, so private ownership 
requires collective permission). Steiner 
and Vallentyne advocate a left-libertari-
anism: they consider that the value of the 
resources left, technology for instance, 
compensates for the excessive degradation 
of resources. For these authors, the “decent 
share proviso” (not giving more than a de-
cent opportunity to use natural resources) 
is not sufficient, and thus one should apply 
an “egalitarian proviso” (the individual ap-
propriates resources if and only if what is 
left provides equal opportunities for use).
For L. H. Meyer and D. Roser, propo-
nents of a sufficientiarist approach, a strict 
egalitarianism is both wrong (it demands 
degrading the state of the better-off for 
the sake of equality, even if this does not 
improve the state of the worse-off) and 
utopian, since it implies the suppression 
of all intergenerational differences. The 
authors advocate the obligation of a suf-
ficient property legacy, but also point out 
that sufficientiarist theories often recom-
mend giving below the necessary resourc-
es threshold. At the same time, Arrhenius 
demonstrates that claims of egalitarianism 
are not logically viable given population 
fluctuations.
The question of intergenerational respon-
sibility raises the possibility to harm future 
generations. Bertram is little convinced 
by the relevance of the Marxist concept 
of exploitation applied to a future set-
ting. If exploitation involves someone (an 
 exploiter) who secures an advantage by ex-
ploiting someone else (the exploited), it is 
impossible to make an informed judgment 
on future benefits or losses. However, the 
non-applicability of this concept does not 
exempt us from paying attention to po-
tentially dangerous acts. This discussion 
highlights a “time bombs” problem: “time 
bombs” involve actions the negative effects 
of which are visible only on a deferred 
basis, therefore suffered by future gener-
ations. To meet the challenge of climate 
responsibility, one should, according to C. 
Wolf, apply a sufficientiarist approach us-
ing a two steps climate policy: the first one 
geared to austerity with specific targets for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and a 
second one labelled as “sustainable”, which 
seeks to maintain emissions at an accept-
able rate.
Kumar strives to redefine the harm im-
posed on future generations with “Scan-
lonian contractualism”: even if there is no 
physical relationship with future humans, 
there is a legal relationship based on what 
is justifiable or not for someone. To illus-
trate this point, he states that the request 
advanced by African-Americans for sym-
bolic as well as materialistic compensation 
for slavery is legitimate, even if the harm 
has been done to them only indirectly.
Therefore, these theories towards future gener-
ations lead us to think not only in epistemic, 
but also in motivational terms. What moti-
vates this current generation to take care of 
the remote future? Birnbacher stresses mo-
tivation obstacles: the abstract character 
of recipients, referred to as invisible and 
faceless, would prevent the development 
of a “chain of love”, to quote Passmore. 
Other constraints are the uncertainty of 
success with actions undertaken (will these 
actions really make a difference for future 
generations?) as well as their cumulative 
nature (will these actions be followed by 
the next generations?). Bykvist also notes 
that future generations’ preferences are un-
predictable. 
For Birnbacher, only indirect motivations 
(over a maximum of two generations) can 
help solve the motivational problem. The 
author gives the example of parents who 
are naturally concerned for the future well-
being of their children and also have an in-
terest in ensuring their children’s support 
in case they depend on them at a certain 
age.
Is it possible to establish a contract with fu-
ture generations? Gardiner acknowledges 
that Rawls was one of the first to address 
the issue of future generations through 
an original contract. However, like Heyd, 
he doubts that Rawls’s contractarian ap-
proach can be extended to an intergenera-
tional framework. Gardiner shows that the 
intergenerational jump involves a reeval-
uation of the design, structure, and ra-
tionale for cooperation: according to him, 
Rawls dismisses the initial generation’s 
problem, which remains a net contribu-
tor. Moreover, Rawls does not explain how 
generations internalise future generations’ 
concern. Heyd adds that, even without 
having the principles of justice based on 
a contractarian approach, there is always a 
value in justice that remains. Attas’s theory, 
on the contrary, seeks to exploit Rawlsian 
contractualism by adding amendments so 
as to extend it to all generations. He ar-
gues, however, that it is difficult to defend 
Rawls’s “two-stage approach”, i.e. the peri-
od of accumulation of wealth and the peri-
od needed to secure fair institutions, since 
the latter necessarily implies a zero increase 
in population.
For Gosseries, cooperation between gener-
ations lies in reciprocity theories. In some 
detail, he analyses the three models of rec-
iprocity theories (ascending, descending, 
reciprocal). For him, the reciprocity re-
quirement is justified not from a perspec-
tive of giving in return, but on the basis 
that it should not be seen as a self-indul-
gent generation, or a “free rider”, when 
compared to previous generations. 
Muniz-Fraticelli, meanwhile, strongly de-
fends the need for a perpetual constitution, 
differentiating himself from two approach-
es: that of Thomas Jefferson, for whom a 
constitution should expire after a certain 
time – and, according to James Madison, 
run the risk of degenerating into anarchy – 
and that of M. Otsuka, for whom the per-
petual foundation of the constitution lies in 
the tacit consent of the youth expressed by 
their choice to remain voluntarily within the 
society. However, “tacit consent” is a vague 
assumption that does not allow the estab-
lishment of a hypothetical consent. Mu-
niz-Fraticelli offers an alternative scheme: a 
perpetual constitution is necessary to ensure 
universal and eternal individual rights, but 
it is also legitimate to give citizens the right 
of amendment and interpretation so that 
they can choose the time to “reconstitute”, 
with respect to constitutionalism.
Some of this work’s limitations concern 




technical. The structure itself, consisting in 
a collection of articles, involves a juxtapo-
sition of opinions which makes it difficult 
for the reader to develop an overview of 
the challenges for future generations. Fur-
thermore, this leads to a certain repetition 
of themes – Rawls’s contract theory is 
presented in four different articles. Some 
omissions are also regrettable, such as the 
absence of utilitarianism, or the analysis 
of intergenerational justice toward non- 
human individuals. These criticisms are, 
however, minimal, given the scale of the 
issues covered by the authors. Without a 
doubt, Intergenerational Justice opens new 
avenues for reflection and action, par-
ticularly on the reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions and on the possibility of a 
 perpetual constitution. The book reflects 
the urgent need to consider and propose 
solutions that can respond, even partially, 
to such a complex problem.
Gosseries, Axel / Meyer, Lukas H. (eds.) 
(2009): Intergenerational Justice. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 432 pages. ISBN: 
978-0-199-28295-1. Price: £70.
he Intergenerational Justice Re-
view (IGJR) has been published 
by the Stuttgart-based think tank 
Foundation for the Rights of Future Gen-
erations (FRFG) since 2002. The 2012 
edition was published in cooperation with 
the London-based Intergenerational Foun-
dation (IF), and likewise the 2015 edition. 
For the latter as well as for the 2016 edi-
tions, the FRFG and IF have been joined 
by the University of Tübingen. The 2016 
(2) edition will have the additional help 
of Professor Bruce Auerbach of Albright 
College, Reading PA, who will be serving 
as a guest editor.
Founded in 1997, the FRFG has played 
a leading role in gathering and support-
ing research in intergenerational issues at 
the academic level – research that usually 
falls within the compass of university de-
partments of law, politics and philosophy. 
The Intergenerational Justice Review reflects 
this academic focus. Articles, submitted 
by senior academics and researchers in the 
field, are peer-reviewed and published only 
on the recommendation of two reviewers.
From 2016, there will be two editions of 
the IGJR annually. The topic of the second 
2016 edition will be:
“Constitutions and Intergenerational 
Justice”
We welcome submissions for this issue of 
the Intergenerational Justice Review that 
address the tension between constitutions 
and intergenerational justice, and how 
that tension can be resolved. How can 
constitutions be written to protect the 
rights and/or interests of future genera-
tions without at the same time becoming a 
barrier to future generations exercising full 
political sovereignty in the future?
We also welcome submissions that address 
creatively constitutions and intergener-
ational justice from other points of view, 
and from the perspective of other cultural 
and political traditions; and that test the 
feasibility of new ideas, such as a “perma-
nent constitutional convention”, that re-
assess the current constitution every five 
years or so.
In addition to the above, other related 
questions include the following:
• How could a permanent constitution-
al convention (see above) be organised? 
What powers should it possess, and what 
should be its limitations? On the one hand 
such limitations should prevent a consti-
tutional convention from being too domi-
nant, while on the other its powers should 
be sufficient to ensure that it is more than 
merely symbolic.
• How can the legitimacy problems of such 
a constitutional convention be resolved? 
For example, parliaments, which usually 
propose constitutional amendments, are 
legitimised through elections.
• Are there any examples of countries 
where constitutions are regularly reviewed 
and amended? If so, how has this practice 
worked?
• What role should constitutional courts 
play? Are they the guardians of earlier reg-
ulations and therefore opponents of con-
stitutional change?
• Are eternity clauses (clauses which pro-
hibit changes to certain or all provisions 
of a constitution) generationally fair? To 
what extent do such guarantees take away 
from future generations the possibility to 
determine their own future?
• Where and how are young people active-
ly engaged in debates about the constitu-
tion in force in their country? What les-
sons can be learnt from their experience?
Background: By their very nature, consti-
tutions are intergenerational documents. 
With rare exceptions, they are meant to 
endure for many generations. They estab-
lish the basic institutions of government, 
enshrine the fundamental values of a peo-
ple, and place certain questions beyond 
the reach of simple majorities. Constitu-
tions, especially written ones, are often on 
purpose difficult to modify.
The question of constitutions and future 
generations has at least two different as-
pects. On the one hand, constitutions pro-
vide the opportunity to guarantee consid-
eration of the rights of future generations, 
and may serve to protect future generations 
against the actions of current electoral ma-
jorities. On the other hand, the provisions 
of a constitution may become outmoded, 
restricting the ability of majorities in the 
future to respond to the real problems in 
ways they see as necessary and proper. We 
want constitutions to provide firm guaran-
tees of fundamental rights, including those 
of future generations. But we do not want 
those same guarantees to become fetters on 
future generations, preventing them from 
exercising the same rights of sovereignty 
we enjoy.
Ideally, constitutions strike a balance be-
tween seeking to protect and perpetuate 
those values and rights the present genera-
tion understands to be fundamental, while 
ensuring the right of future generations to 
define for themselves the values and rights 
they see as essential, and to modify the in-
stitutions they have inherited in light of 
their own experience.
This tension between durability and flexi-
bility finds expression in Edmund Burke’s 
Call for Papers: Constitutions and Intergenerational Justice
T
